Abstract In this paper, we introduce Saber, a package of cryptographic primitives whose security relies on the hardness of the Module Learning With Rounding problem (Mod-LWR). We first describe a secure DiffieHellman type key exchange protocol, which is then transformed into an IND-CPA encryption scheme and finally into an IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanism using a post-quantum version of the FujisakiOkamoto transform. The design goals of this package were simplicity, efficiency and flexibility resulting in the following choices: all integer moduli are powers of 2 avoiding modular reduction and rejection sampling entirely; the use of LWR halves the amount of randomness required compared to LWE-based schemes and reduces bandwidth; the module structure provides flexibility by reusing one core component for multiple security levels. A constant-time AVX2 optimized software implementation of the KEM with parameters providing more than 128 bits of post-quantum security, requires only 101K, 125K and 129K cycles for key generation, encapsulation and decapsulation respectively on a Dell laptop with an Intel i7-Haswell processor.
Introduction
The threat of quantum computers, which break most widely used public key cryptographic primitives, has sparked a rising interest in post-quantum cryptography. This is emphasized by organizations such as ETSI and NIST that are looking towards standardization of post-quantum cryptography [19] . Lattice based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates that are resilient to all known quantum attacks. Examples include NTRU based schemes [29, 45, 11] and protocols based on the (ring)-Learning With Errors (LWE) problem: Alkim et al. [4] presented 'A New Hope', based on the ring-LWE problem; Bos et al. [17] introduced an alternative scheme called 'Frodo' based solely on LWE, but suffers from higher bandwidth and computational complexity; Bhattacharya et al. [12] improved upon the bandwidth of 'Frodo', by basing their protocol on LWR whilst still avoiding the use of rings; Bos et al. [16] presented a CCA-secure Mod-LWE based key exchange called 'Kyber' which takes the middle road between 'Frodo' and 'a New Hope' by using modules. Concurrently to our work, Jin et al. described a generic key exchange for Ring-LWE, Mod-LWE, LWE and LWR in [33] , and Baan et al. [8] described a LWR, Ring-LWR key exchange.
In this paper, we introduce Saber, a suite of cryptographic primitives based on the Mod-LWR problem. The choices we made for the underlying hard problem and also the actual parameters of the scheme were motivated by three design principles: simplicity of the scheme and its implementation, efficiency and flexibility:
-Learning with Rounding (LWR) [10] : schemes based on (variants of) LWE require sampling from noise distributions, which needs randomness. Furthermore, the noise is included in public keys and ciphertexts resulting in higher bandwidth. LWR based schemes naturally reduce the bandwidth while avoiding additional randomness for the noise since it is deterministically obtained. -Choice of moduli: we choose all integer moduli in the scheme to be powers of 2. This eliminates the need for explicit modular reduction and complicated sampling routines such as rejection sampling. We also prove that using powers of two, the keys are unbiased and that there is no need for steps such as uplifting and randomization or decoding of the exchanged information. These advantages contribute to the simplicity of our design, and facilitate constant time implementations. The main disadvantage of using such moduli is that it excludes the use of the number theoretic transform (NTT) to speed up polynomial multiplication. We propose the use of a combination of Toom-Cook and Karatsuba polynomial multiplication to mitigate this disadvantage. -Modules [36, 16] : the module versions of the problems (see Section 2) allow to interpolate between the original pure LWE/LWR problems and their ring versions, lowering computational complexity and bandwidth compared to LWE/LWR, while introducing protection against attacks on the ring structure of Ring-LWE/LWR and flexibility to move to higher security levels without any need to change the underlying arithmetic.
A high-level constant-time software implementation of Saber is provided and has been placed in the public domain 1 as part of the submission to the NIST competition. The implementation has been optimized using AVX2 instructions available in modern Intel processors and uses a combination of Toom-Cook and Karatsuba polynomial multiplication algorithms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we review the necessary background; we present a secure Diffie-Hellman type key exchange scheme in Section 3, a CPA secure encryption scheme in Section 4 and a CCA secure key encapsulation mechanism in Section 5. A security analysis of the hardness on the underlying mod-LWR problem is given in Section 6.1, based on which three parameter sets are chosen in Section 6.2. Finally, specific implementation choices that speed up our protocols are discussed in Section 7 and our implementation results are compared with the state of the art in Section 8.
Preliminaries

Notation
We denote with Z q the ring of integers modulo an integer q with representants in [0, q) and for an integer z, we denote z mod q the reduction of z in [0, q). R q is the quotient ring Z q [X]/(X n + 1) with n a fixed power of 2 (we only need n = 256). For any ring R, R l×k denotes the ring of l × k-matrices over R. For p | q, the mod p operator is extended to (matrices over) R q by applying it coefficient-wise. Single polynomials are written without markup, vectors are bold lower case and matrices are denoted with bold upper case. U denotes the uniform distribution and β µ is a centered binomial distribution with parameter µ and corresponding standard deviation σ = µ/2. If χ is a probability distribution over a set S, then x ← χ denotes sampling x ∈ S according to χ. If χ is defined on Z q , X X X ← χ(R l×k q ) denotes sampling the matrix X X X ∈ R l×k q , where all coefficients of the entries in X X X are sampled from χ.
We use the part selection function bits(x, i, j) with j ≤ i to access j consecutive bits of a positive integer x ending at the i-th index (assuming least significant bit in the 0-th index), producing an integer in Z 2 j ; i.e., written in standard C code the function returns (
, where is the right-shift operator. This is explained in Fig. 1 .The part selection function is extended to polynomials and matrices by applying it coefficient-wise. Finally let denote rounding to the nearest integer, which can be extended to polynomials and matrices coefficient-wise. 
Cryptographic definitions
Let KE be a Diffie-Hellman type key exchange protocol between two parties as illustrated in Protocol 1. KE is called (1 − δ)-correct if after execution of the protocol P r[k = k] 1 − δ, where the probability is computed over the random coins used in Protocol 1. KE is called IND-RND secure if it is hard for an adversary to distinguish the real shared secret from random. More formally, we define the advantage of an adversary in distinguishing the key k from a uniformly random keyk ← U(K) as follows:
Adv ind-rnd KE (A) = P r A(P, A, B, k) = 1 − P r A(P, A, B,k) = 1 .
A public key encryption scheme consists of a triple of functions PKE = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec), where KeyGen returns a secret key sk and a public key pk; Enc takes a public key pk and a message m ∈ M to produce a ciphertext c ∈ C, and Dec takes the secret key sk together with ciphertext c to output a message m ∈ M or the symbol ⊥ to denote rejection. The PKE is said to be (
where the probability is taken over (pk, sk) ← KeyGen and the random coins of Enc. We use the notion of indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and define the advantage of an adversary A by:
The weaker notion of one-wayness under chosen plaintext attacks (OW-CPA) is defined as:
A key-encapsulation mechanism KEM = (KeyGen, Encaps, Decaps) is a triple of probabilistic algorithms, where KeyGen returns a secret key sk and a public key pk, where Encaps takes a public key pk and produces a ciphertext c and a key k ∈ K, and where Decaps takes the secret key sk, the public key pk and ciphertext c to return a key k ∈ K or the symbol ⊥ to denote rejection. The KEM is said to be (1−δ)-correct if P r[Decaps(sk, c) = k : (c, k) ← Encaps(pk)] 1−δ, where the probability is taken over (pk, sk) ← KeyGen and the random coins of Encaps. We use the notion of indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) to define the advantage of an adversary A by:
The advantage of an adversary A in distinguishing a pseudorandom generator gen() with seed seed A A A ← U({0, 1} 256 ) from a uniformly random distribution is defined as follows:
(1)
LWE, LWR and Mod-LWR problems
The learning with errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [41] and its decisional version states that it is hard to distinguish uniform random samples (a a a, u) ← U(Z l×1 q × Z q ) from LWE-samples of the form
where the secret vector s s s ← β µ (Z l×1 q ) is fixed for all samples, a a a ← U(Z l×1 q ) and e ← β µ (Z q ) is a small error. A module version of LWE, called Mod-LWE, was analyzed by Langlois and Stehlé [36] and essentially replaces the ring Z q in the above samples by a quotient ring of the form R q with corresponding error distribution β µ (R l×1 q ). The rank of the module is l and the dimension of the ring R q is n. The case l = 1 corresponds to the ring-LWE problem introduced in [37] .
The LWR problem was introduced by Banerjee et al. [10] and is a derandomized version of the LWE problem. In contrast to the LWE problem, the "noise" in the LWR problem is generated deterministically by scaling and rounding coefficients modulo q to modulo p (with p < q). In detail, an LWR sample is given by
for a fixed s s s ← β µ (Z l×1 q ) and uniform random a a a ← U(Z l×1 q ). The decisional LWR problem states that is it hard to distinguish samples from the LWR distribution from that of the uniform distribution. A reduction from the LWE problem to the LWR problem was given by Banerjee et al. [10] , and further improved by Alwen et al. [6] , Bogdanov et al. [15] and, Alperin-Sheriff and Daniel Apon [5] .
The security of our protocol relies on the hardness of the module version of LWR (Mod-LWR), which is a straightforward generalization of Mod-LWE. A Mod-LWR sample is given by
where the secret s s s ← β µ (R 
Key Exchange
In Protocol 2 we describe a Diffie-Hellman type key exchange scheme Saber.KE based on the hardness of Mod-LWR problem. Unlike the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [23] , in our scheme the two communicating parties sometimes fail to agree on the same key. As in previous works [24, 40, 12] , we can make this failure probability negligibly small by sending some additional reconciliation data c.
Protocol 2: Saber.KE key exchange All moduli involved in the scheme are chosen to be powers of 2, in particular we choose q = 2 q , p = 2 p and t = 2 t with q > p > ( t +1), so we have 2t | p | q. In practice, our main parameter set will correspond to the case q = 13, p = 10 and t = 3. The secret vectors s s s and s s s are sampled from β µ (R l×1 q ), with µ < p, while the matrix A A A ∈ R l×l q is sampled using a pseudorandom generator gen() initialized with seed A . The session key is obtained by feeding the common secret k = k ∈ R 2 into a key derivation function kdf(). The algorithm also uses three constants: a constant vector h h h ∈ R l×1 q consisting of polynomials all coefficients of which are set to the constant 2 q − p−1 , a constant polynomial h 1 ∈ R q with all coefficients equal to 2 q − p−1 , and a constant polynomial h 2 ∈ R q with all coefficients set equal to (2 p −2 − 2 p − t−2 ). These constants are used to mimic rounding operations, which are necessary to reduce failure probability, while retaining the reduction to the underlying decisional Mod-LWR problem.
Note that the operations bits(s s s, p , p ) in line 6 and bits(s s s , p , p ) in line 7 simply mean we are considering s s s mod p and s s s mod p as elements in R p which is well defined since p | q.
Correctness: Using Saber.KE two communicating parties agree on a common random key with overwhelming probability. A tight bound on the failure probability can be obtained using following observations from Bos et al. [17] : the reconciliation between two integer values v i , v i ∈ Z p is correct if the distance between v i and v i is smaller than p/4(1 − 1/t), and fails if the distance is bigger than p/4(1 + 1/t). In between these values, the probability of success decreases linearly from 1 to 0. Consequently, a tight bound on the failure probability given the distribution of ∆v i = v i − v i can be calculated by adding to ∆v i a discrete uniformly distributed error e r ∈ Z p with range [−p/4t, p/4t]. The success probability of the reconciliation between v i and v i then equals P r[|∆v i + e r | < p/4]. Using the above observation we can estimate a bound on the error probability: then after executing the Saber.KE protocol, both communicating parties agree on a n-bit key with probability 1 − δ. e e e T s s s mod p). Here, the coefficients of e e e, e e e are the rounding errors and so are in (−1/2, 1/2]. It can be easily seen that the values calculated by the communicating parties differ by ∆v = ||(s s s T e e e − e e e T s s s) mod p||. Therefore, Bob and Alice agree on the same secret if ||∆v + e r || ∞ ≤ p 4 . Hence, for δ = P r[||(s s s T e e e − e e e T s s s + e r ) mod p|| ∞ > p/4] the Saber.KE protocol is (1 − δ) correct.
Similar to Bos et al. [16] , a tight upper bound on the value of δ is calculated using a Python script. To be able to practically compute the distribution of
Bos et al. assume independence between the terms s s s
T e e e and e e e T s s s, which is not necessarily the case. Analogous to Theorem 5.2 from Jin and Zhao [33] , one could argue that they are independent if conditioned on s s s T A A As s s ≡ a mod q/p, where a ∈ R q/p . The recommended parameter set described in Section 6.2 yields δ < 2 −136 . Unbiased keys: Since our moduli are powers of 2 and as such non-prime, there exists (negligibly small) exceptional sets for s s s and s s s such that the common key is biased. The intuition is that if all coefficients of the polynomials in s s s or s s s are divisible by a high power of 2, the same property will hold for A A As s s or A A A T s s s , and their scaled versions. The following theorem however shows that outside these sets, uniformity is attained. Theorem 2. Let S bad denote the set of elements in R l×1 q for which none of the coefficients w satisfies gcd(w, q)|(q/p) and let S bad denote the set of elements in R l×1 q for which none of the coefficients w satisfies gcd(w, p)|(p/2). Let s s s, s s s ← β µ (R l×1 q ) and let A A A ← U(R l×l q ) and determine k as follows:
For s s s / ∈ S bad and s s s / ∈ S bad , k is distributed uniformly for A A A ← U(R l×l q ). This occurs with a probability P r[s s s /
Proof. Note that the multiplication of a uniformly distributed coefficient of A A A, by a coefficient w of s s s, is uniformly distributed in its p most significant bits if gcd(w, q)|(q/p), which is equivalent to stating that pw/q is invertible in Z p . The distribution of the coefficients of b b b = bits(A A As s s + h h h, q , p ) is as follows: since convolution of any distribution with a uniform distribution in Z p results again in a uniform distribution in Z p , we need only one term of the summation step to be uniform in its p most significant bits. Therefore, the coefficients of b b b will be uniformly distributed if s s s / ∈ S bad . Finally note that the distribution of Since in our setting s s s, s s s are sampled from β µ (R q ), the coefficients are small and thus the only sampleable vector in S bad and S bad is the all zero vector which occurs with probability 2 −1436 . In the rest of the paper, we assume that the secret vectors are not in the vector sets: s s s / ∈ S bad and s s s / ∈ S bad . Security: The security of Saber.KE can be reduced to the decisional Mod-LWR problem as shown by the following theorem. 
Proof. The IND-RND security of our key exchange can be expressed as the probability that an adversary A can distinguish between k and a uniformly random keyk ← U(K), given the public information A A A,b b b,b b b and c. The proof proceeds by a sequence of games G i , where Adv Gi (A) = |P r[S A,i ] − 1/2|, in which S A,i is the event that the adversary guesses correctly in game G i . The sequence of games is depicted in Figure 2 .
The first game G 0 is the original game. In game G 1 , the public matrix is no longer generated using the pseudorandom generator gen(), but is sampled from a uniformly random distribution. An adversary that can distinguish these Game G0:
Game G1: Game G2:
Game G3: Game G4: Game G5: In game G 2 , the number of bits dropped in the calculation of b b b and c is q − p and p − t − 1 respectively, which is reduced to q − p in game G 3 . If we compare G 3 to G 2 , since ( q − p ) ( p − t − 1), the number of dropped bits is the same or less, and therefore the number of available bits to the adversary is at least the same. From this we conclude that G 2 is at least as hard as G 3 : ∀A, ∃A : Adv G2 (A) Adv G3 (A ).
Up p , where q is a power of two, and since k is generated as the first bit of v , k is also uniformly distributed, and therefore P r[S A ,5 ] = 1/2. Working backwards from the probability of success in game G 5 to that in game G 0 , and using the fact that Adv Gi (A) = |P r[S A,i ]−1/2|, gives the desired result.
CPA secure encryption
The key exchange scheme of the previous section can be transformed into a CPA secure public-key encryption scheme Saber.PKE by using a similar transformation from Diffie-Hellman key exchange to ElGamal encryption, i.e. the messages sent by Alice now define her public key, and the encryption simply consists of an XOR with the common (pre)key.
The message space is M ∈ {0, 1} n and a message m ∈ M is represented as an element in R q with coefficients in {0, 1}. Algorithms 1 to 3 describe the public-key encryption scheme Saber.PKE=(KeyGen,Enc,Dec), where the setup parameters are the same as in the key-exchange scheme described before. If the optional parameter r is specified while calling Saber.ENC, it is used as a seed to generate the secret vector s s s . 
Security and Correctness: It is easily seen that the security and correctness of the encryption scheme are equivalent to that of the key exchange introduced in Section 3. Proof. The proof proceeds by showing the equivalence between Saber.PKE and the combination of Saber.KE with a one time pad of the message m with k KE . Note that the most significant bit of each coefficient of v is equal to the corresponding (pre)key bits of k in Saber.KE. Therefore, in line 5 of the Alg. 2, the addition is essentially a one time pad of the message bits m with the coefficients of the (pre)key k in the key exchange scheme (Protocol. 2). We can therefore conclude that the security of our encryption equals the security of our key exchange scheme for the same parameters. Similarly, it can be seen that Saber.PKE is correct if the keys k and k are equal. Hence, the correctness of the encryption scheme is equivalent to the correctness of the key exchange in Protocol. 2.
CCA secure KEM
The CPA secure encryption scheme can be turned into a CCA secure KEM Saber.KEM=(Encaps, Decaps) using an appropriate transformation. Recently, several post-quantum versions [30, 46, 42, 32] of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform with corresponding security reductions have been developed. At this point, the FO ⊥ transformation in [30] with post-quantum reduction from Jiang et al. [32] gives the tightest reduction for schemes with non-perfect correctness. However, other transformations could be used to turn Saber.PKE into a CCA secure KEM. 
Saber.KEM is described in detail in Algorithm 4 and 5. The functions G : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l×n and H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n are hash functions,z is a secret random seed used to return a pseudorandom response when the re-encryption fails, and the Saber.Enc and Saber.Dec functions are from the CPA secure asymmetric encryption described in Section 4.
Correctness: Following Hofheinz et al. [30] , Saber.KEM is (1 − δ) correct if and only if Saber.PKE is (1 − δ) correct, and thus also if and only if Saber.KE is (1 − δ) correct.
Security: By modeling the hash functions G and H as random oracles, a lower bound on the CCA security can be proven. We use the security bounds of Hofheinz et al. [30] , which considers a KEM variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform that can also handle a small failure probability δ of the encryption scheme. This failure probability should be cryptographically negligibly small for the security to hold. Using Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 from [30] , we get the following theorems for the security and correctness of our KEM in the random oracle model:
Theorem 5 (ROM, Hofheinz et al. [30] ). For a IND-CCA adversary B, making at most q H and q G queries to respectively the random oracle G and H, and q D queries to the decryption oracle, there exists an IND-CPA adversary A such that:
Jiang et al. [32] also provide a security reduction against a quantum adversary in the quantum random oracle model from IND-CCA security to OW-CPA security. IND-CPA with a sufficiently large message space implies OW-CPA [30, 13] . Therefore, we can reduce the IND-CCA security of Saber.KEM to the IND.CPA security of the underlying public key encryption:
Theorem 6 (QROM, Jiang et al. [32] ). For any IND-CCA quantum adversary B, making at most q H and q G queries to respectively the random quantum oracle G and H, and q D many (classical) queries to the decryption oracle, there exists an adversary A such that:
Saber.PKE (A)
Multi target protection: As described in [16] , hashing the public key intô K has two beneficial effects: it makes sure that K depends on the input of both parties, and it offers multi-target protection. In this scenario, the adversary uses Grover's algorithm to precompute an m that has a relatively high failure probability. Hashing pk intoK ensures that an attacker is not able to use precomputed 'weak' values of m.
6 Security analysis and parameter selection
Security analysis
Our security analysis is similar to the one in 'a New Hope' [4] . The hardness of Mod-LWR is analyzed as an LWE problem, since there are no known attacks that make use of the Module or LWR structure. A set of l LWR samples given by with A A A ← U(R We can lift this to a problem modulo q by multiplying by where q/p e e e is the random variable containing the error introduced by the rounding operation, of which the coefficients are discrete and nearly uniformly distributed in (−q/2p, q/2p]. BKW type of attacks [35] and linearization attacks [7] are not feasible, since the number of samples is at most double the dimension of the lattice. Moreover, the secret vectors s s s and s s s are dense enough to avoid the sparse secret attack described by Albrecht [2] . As a result, we end up with two main type of attacks: the primal and the dual attack, that make use of BKZ lattice reduction [20, 43] .
Weighted Primal Attack The primal attack constructs a lattice that has a unique shortest vector that contains the noise e e e and the secret s s s. BKZ, with block dimension b, can be used to find this unique solution. An LWE sample has norm λ ≈ nσ 2 s + mσ 2 e . Using heuristic models, the primal attack succeeds if [4] :
where: δ = ((πb)
However, the vector v v v = (s s s, e e e, 1) is unbalanced since ||s s s i || is not necessarily equal to ||e e e i ||. In our case, ||s s s i || < ||e e e i ||, which can be exploited by the lattice rescaling method described by Bai et al. [9] , and further analysed in [22] . Analogous to [4] , the primal attack is successful if the projected norm of the unique shortest vector on the last b Gram-Schmidt vectors is shorter than the (d − b) th Gram-Schmidt vector, or:
Weighted is generated uniformly, z will also be uniform mod q. Since in our case, ||s s s i || < ||e e e i ||, we observe that the w w ws s s term will be smaller than the v v ve e e term. The weighted attack [9, 22] optimizes the shortest vector so that these terms have a similar variance, by considering the weighted lattice Λ = {(x x x, y y y ) ∈ Z m × (α −1 Z) n : (x x x, αy y y ) ∈ Λ mod q}. Following the strategy of [4] , we can calculate the cost of the dual attack. The statistical distance between a uniformly distributed z and a Gaussian distributed z is bounded by = 4exp(−2π 2 τ 2 ), where τ = ||u u u||σ e /q . Since the key is hashed, an advantage of is not sufficient and must be repeated at least R = max(1, 1/(2 0.2075b 2 )) times. The cost of the dual attack is thus equal to:
Parameter selection
We use a python script to choose parameters q, p and t for optimum usage of communication bandwidth, while achieving a quantum security level of 128 and failure probability 2 −128 . Additional parameter sets are generated as Light and Fire versions of the Saber.KEM, a light and paranoid version respectively.
We would like to remark that choosing p and q as primes facilitates the use of NTT based polynomial multiplications [16, 3] . However, rounding from R q to R p introduces significant bias as p q. Bogdanov et al. [15] proved the pseudorandomness of the LWR problem for moduli p and q for general lattices but left it as open problem for the ring version. However by choosing p and q as a power-of-two, we can be assured of the pseudorandomness, which we also showed in Subsection. 3. 
Implementation
In this section, we describe a constant-time software implementation of Saber. Our implementation is relatively simpler than several existing lattice-based postquantum key exchange schemes [16, 4, 17] . This is primarily due to the underlying LWR problem and our choice of power-of-two moduli. As the LWR problem inherently introduces errors, Saber can bypass error sampling operations unlike other LWE-based schemes. Our choice of power-of-two moduli results in faster arithmetic operations and does not require rejection sampling [4, 16] for generating the random matrix A. In the remaining part of this section we describe the building blocks that are used to realize an efficient implementation of Saber. Symmetric primitives The hash functions G and H in the CCA-secure Saber-KEM are implemented using SHA3-512 and SHA3-256 respectively, standardized in FIPS 202 [1] . For pseudorandom number generation, we use the extendable output function SHAKE-128 [1] . On parallel platforms, such as Intel processors that support 'single instruction multiple data' (SIMD), one can speedup pseudorandom number generation by using a vectorized implementation of SHAKE-128 and multiple seed values [16] . We decided to use SHAKE-128 serially to generate pseudorandom byte string of a required length from a given seed. This is mainly because of the fact that on majority of resource-constrained platforms (e.g., billions of IoT devices) SIMD would not be feasible, and hence multiple execution of SHAKE-128 would worsen performance (time and energy) because of the costly initialization operation [1] performed in each execution of SHAKE-128. Note that, it is essential for the correctness of the KEM, that all parties generate pseudorandomness in the same way.
Secret polynomial generation Saber requires sampling of secret polynomials from an error distribution. In lattice-based public-key cryptography this error distribution is usually a discrete Gaussian distribution. A significant number of papers [27, 44, 39, 18, 25, 26] improve the performance of discrete Gaussian sampling. However, the implementation of a constant-time Gaussian sampler turns out to be a challenging problem [38, 34] . This motivated the authors of NewHope [4] to use a centered binomial distribution instead of a Gaussian distribution. Sampling from a centered binomial distribution can be performed easily [4] in constant time by comparing the Hamming weights of two random integers of same length. Hence we use a centered binomial distribution β µ with the parameter µ = 8 to sample the secret polynomials.
Matrix A generation Since A consists of 9 polynomials, each having 256 13-bit coefficients, we use SHAKE-128 to generate 9 · 256 · 13/8 = 3, 744 pseudorandom bytes. Next we pack these bytes into the 13-bit coefficients of A. Note that in our case no additional rejection sampling is required as in Kyber, due to their use of a prime moduli. The rejection sampling wastes a portion of the generated pseudorandom bytes.
Polynomial arithmetic Our protocols relies heavily on polynomial arithmetic in the ring R q with modulus q = 2 13 and the irreducible polynomial f (x) = x 256 + 1. While polynomial addition and subtraction are simple coefficient-wise addition and subtraction operations, polynomial multiplication is a costly operation. An optimized polynomial multiplication routine is crucial for an efficient implementation of Saber. Since q is not a prime, we cannot apply the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) unlike the key exchange schemes such as 'New Hope' [4] , Kyber [16] etc. The next best alternative is the Karatsuba method which does not require any special modulus. Hence we use the Karatsuba polynomial multiplication method in Saber. The Karatsuba polynomial multiplication has a higher asymptotic complexity of O(n log 2 3 ). Though we lose in asymptotic time complexity, we gain in modular arithmetic since modular reduction comes for free. Furthermore, we found that the Karatsuba polynomial multiplication method is relatively easier to vectorize in modern Intel processors that support AVX/AVX2 'single instruction multiple data' (SIMD) instructions.
The Karatsuba multiplication method follows a top-down recursive approach: a 256-coefficient polynomial multiplication is split into three 128-coefficient polynomial multiplications, next each 128-coefficient polynomial multiplication is split into three 64-coefficient polynomial multiplications, and so on. After several levels of recursive splitting, when the polynomial size becomes small enough, i.e., reaches a particular threshold, a quadratic-complexity polynomial multiplication such as the School-book method is used to compute the smallest polynomial multiplications. If we set the threshold value to 16, then a 256-coefficient Karatsuba polynomial multiplication calls the School-book polynomial multiplication routine 81 times.
However, we can improve this by using the Toom-Cook polynomial multiplication. The Toom-Cook method is a generalization of the Karatsuba method and can be used to split a 256-coefficient polynomial multiplication into seven 64-coefficient polynomial multiplications. This is called four-way Toom-Cook multiplication. The smaller multiplications can be computed using the Karatsuba method as described above. Thus using the four-way Toom-Cook multiplication, the total number of calls to the School-book multiplication routine reduces to only 63 for a 256-coefficient polynomial multiplication.
In the Toom-Cook multiplication the choice of the evaluation points affects the computation time. Following [14] , we choose the set of evaluation points to be {0, ±1/2, ±1, 2, ∞}. In the interpolation phase multiplications and divisions by scalar constants are performed. Divisions by odd scalars are performed by computing multiplications by their respective inverses. However, the inverse of an even divisor does not exist when the modulus is a power of two, which is true for Saber. For an even divisor we compute the division in two steps: first, we multiply by the inverse of the odd factor, then we compute a true division (i.e. right shifting) by the power-of-two factor since we know beforehand the division has to be exact. In the four-way Toom-Cook multiplication, the maximum powerof-two factor we have is 8, which could result in a loss of precision of 3 bits. Hence, during the interpolation phase, we allow the intermediate coefficients to grow by 3 bits such that the extra bits can be used to calculate the divisions by 2, 4 and 8. Our choice of modulus q = 2
13 is especially helpful since we can use 16-bit data variables (short integers in C) to store the 13-bit coefficients. The steps are shown in Algorithm 6 in Appendix A.
AVX2 implementation of polynomial multiplication Starting from Sandy Bridge, Intel provides AVX/AVX2 SIMD instructions that support computation on 128/256-bit vectors. We utilize this feature to achieve fast polynomial multiplication inspired by the software implementations of NTRU Prime [11] and NTRU KEM [31] . In Algorithm 6 the interpolation phase is trivial to vectorize. However, the evaluation phase, where 64-coefficient polynomial multiplications are performed requires special care to take advantage of vectorized instructions. We explain this below.
Assume that we want to compute 16 polynomial multiplications
where each polynomial has 16 coefficients. Also assume that the polynomials are stored in two AVX2-arrays C AV X and D AV X as shown in Figure 3 . The i-th coefficients of all C j (and D j ) polynomials reside in the same AVX2 vectors. With such an arrangement it is easy to compute the 16 polynomial multiplications in a batch by multiplying the elements of C AV X and D AV X . We design the polynomial multiplier routine with the aim to obtain such an arrangement of coefficients during the threshold School-book multiplications. This is explained below.
The seven 64-coefficient polynomial multiplications in Algorithm 6 require 63 School-book multiplications of 16-coefficient polynomials. Since a 16-coefficient polynomial fits in an AVX2 vector, the 63 School-book multiplications can be computed in 4 batches using vectorized instructions. However, the batching is not trivial to implement. In the Karatsuba recursion, we do not immediately compute a School-book multiplication every time the recursion reaches the threshold condition. Instead, a lazy approach is adapted. We keep two 'buckets' each of which is an array of 16 AVX2 vectors. These buckets are gradually filled with the 16-coefficient polynomials that are the multiplicands of the School-book multiplications. Once the buckets are full, each of them can be viewed as a 16 × 16 matrix, containing 256 coefficients. Next we transpose the matrices using a sequence of AVX2 operations to reach the arrangement as shown in Figure 3 . Now a batch multiplication is performed. The result is a collection of 31 vectors. This is again transposed to get the result of each 16-coefficient polynomial multiplication in two vectors. This lazy approach requires a bookkeeping which has a small overhead. 
Results
In Table 3 , we compare our software implementation of Saber with software implementations of other lattice based post-quantum key exchange and encryption schemes. We compiled the Saber software using gcc-7.1 with optimization flags -O3 and measured computation time using a single core of a Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6600U processor running at 2.60GHz with hyper-threading, Turbo-Boost, and multi-core support disabled on a Dell Latitude E7470 laptop with Ubuntu 16.04 operating system. We remark that a totally fair comparison between the listed schemes and their software implementations is not possible since they are based on different hard problems, offer different levels of post-quantum security, implemented with different levels of optimizations and benchmarked on different platforms. Nevertheless, it is clear from the table that Saber is highly efficient both in terms of bandwidth and computation time.
The implementations of Saber and Kyber use similar building blocks namely polynomial multiplication, generation of random matrix A A A, sampling of small secret (and error) polynomials and standard symmetric-key primitives for CCA transformations. In Table 2 , we compare the performances of these building blocks excluding the symmetric-key primitives. Our Toom-Cook multiplication requires only 3,439 cycles. On the other hand, Kyber uses highly AVX-optimized NTT for polynomial multiplications. Furthermore, Kyber spends much less cycles in polynomial multiplications by generating the matrix A in the NTT domain directly and by keeping the secret polynomials in the NTT domain.
Saber does not require sampling of error polynomials, thus saving in computation time and entropy usage. As already described in Section 7 generating the random matrix A is faster in Saber (when same pseudorandom number generator is used) since rejection sampling is not performed, resulting in optimal usage of random numbers. Though in this paper we consider only software implementation on high-end Intel processors, we would like to remark that random number generation is very expensive on resource-constrained platforms. When we compare the high-level C implementations of Saber and Kyber, we see that Saber performs better than Kyber.
Finally note that at the expense of either using larger public keys, or caching the decompressed matrix A A A, the implementation would run at least 25% faster. 9 Acknowledgements
